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I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 20, 2012, Plaintiff/Appellant Jeffry J. Black ("Black") filed his Opening 
Brief on Appeal against the Defendant/ Appellee, Idaho State Police ("ISP"), arguing that the 
district court erred in granting ISP summary judgment on Black's claims made pursuant to the 
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act, Idaho Code § 6-2101, et seq. ("Whistle blower Act"). 
ISP filed Respondents' Brief defending the district court's grant of summary judgment on 
September 10, 2012. Black now submits this Reply Brief on Appeal and respectfully requests 
that the Court reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of ISP and for 
remand to the district court for further proceedings. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Black has demonstrated that he engaged in activity protected by the Idaho 
Protection of Public Employees Act. 
L The District Court misapplied authority regarding common law public 
policy claims to Black's statutory claim under the IP PEA. 
ISP argues that "[t]he district court's analysis demonstrates it understood that to 
determine whether Black engaged in protected activity, it had to evaluate whether the undisputed 
facts constituted a communication in good faith about a violation of law or a refusal to carry out 
a directive that Black reasonably believed violated the law." Response Br., p. 9. ISP supports 
this assertion by arguing that Whistle blower claims involve questions of both law and fact. Id. at 
p. 10. 
With respect to questions of law, the District Court's opm1on shows that it 
believed it was obligated to review Idaho law and determine if Black engaged in activity that was 
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protected. See R., pp. 000519-000523. Operating under this mistaken belief, the District Court 
categorized Black's activity as "the questioning of authority" and held that it was unprotected 
activity. R., pp. 000520 and 000522. If Black had asserted a common law claim wrongful 
termination based upon a retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy, Black would agree 
the district court had an obligation to determine if the activity engaged in was protected. 
However, in light of this Court's decision in Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 212 P.3d, 
982 (2009), Black's claims were brought exclusively under the Whistleblower Act. R., 000006-
000011. As such, there was no need for the district court to determine whether Black had 
engaged in activity that was protected. Instead, all that was required of the Court was to 
determine, after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Black and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in his favor, whether Black had engaged in any of the enumerated activities set forth 
in Idaho Code§ 6-2104. 147 Idaho 558, 212 P.3d at 987 (noting that "[p]rotected activities 
under the Whistle blower Act are described" in Idaho Code § 6-2104). 
With respect to questions of fact under the Whistleblower Act, as this Court's 
prior cases amply demonstrate, factual questions are for the jury to decide. The question of 
whether an action was taken in good faith is a factual question to be decided by the jury. Curlee 
v. Kootenai Co. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 400, 224 P.3d 458, 467 (2008). The question of 
whether an action or belief was reasonable is a factual question to be decided by the jury. See 
Anderson et al. v. Foster, 73 Idaho 340, 347, 252 P.2d 199, 203 (1953). Given these clearly 
established standards, it is clear that a jury, not the district court, was to evaluate whether the 
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facts demonstrate that Black made his communications in good faith or that Black's refusal was 
based upon a reasonable belief of a violation of law. 
ISP cites to the cases of Patterson v. Dept. of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 
256 P.3d 718 (2011), and Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 212 P.3d, 982 (2009), in 
support of its position that a district court may decide whether conduct is protected activity when 
presented with undisputed facts. Neither of these cases provides the support ISP seeks. 
Patterson addressed claims made under the Whistleblower Act as well as the 
Idaho Human Rights Act ("IHRA"). 151 Idaho at 315, 256 P.3d at 723. The only 
Whistleblower Act issue addressed by the Court under the claim was timely filed. Id. When 
addressing the IHRA claims, the Court did address the trial court's holding as a matter of law 
that the facts did not support a claim. Id. at 317-321, 256 P.3d 725-729. This Court sustained 
the trial court's holding given that the facts presented did not demonstrate that members of a 
protected class were treated differently from members of a non-protected class. Id. The Court 
was able to make this determination by looking at the language of the IHRA itself. This Court 
further held that the plaintiff could not have had an objectively reasonable belief that she was 
engaging in protected activity given that the "great weight of case law did not support [her] 
position." Id. at 321, 256 P.3d at 729 (citations omitted). In contrast to Patterson, there is no 
Idaho case law which directly addresses Black's claims, nor does the "great weight of case law" 
from other jurisdictions indicate that Black's position is erroneous. The lack of case supports 
allowing this matter to proceed to trial for a jury determination of whether Black acted in good 
faith and upon a reasonable belief. 
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In Van, this Court did uphold dismissal of Whistleblower Act claims where the 
claims were based upon "potential future waste, rather than past or present waste." 14 7 Idaho at 
559, 212 P.3d at 989. However, this dismissal was upheld based upon the plain language of the 
Whistleblower Act which mandates reports of present or past conduct, not potential future 
conduct. Id. Thus, to the extent the plaintiffs claims were based upon future conduct, the 
plaintiffs action was not protected because it was not activity enumerated in the Whistleblower 
Act. In contrast, Black reported past and present directives believed to be in violation of law. 
As such, Black's conduct was an activity enumerated in Idaho Code § 6-2104 and was protected 
activity. 
As the foregoing demonstrates, Patterson and Van do not stand for the 
proposition advocated by ISP. However, even if these decisions of the Court allowed a district 
court to decide as a matter of law whether protected activity exists in the face of undisputed 
facts, this case does not involve undisputed facts with respect to the good faith and reasonable 
belief requirements. Black presented facts which he contends show the communication was in 
good faith and reasonable. ISP contends that Black did not make the communication in good 
faith and could not have had a reasonable belief of a law violation. Given that there is a factual 
dispute among the parties as to these issues, this case should be allowed to proceed to trial. 
2. The District Court erred by holding that Black is only entitled to 
protection i(he refitsed to perform an illegal act. 
In response to Black's challenging the district court's holding that Black is only 
entitled to protection if he refused to perform an act that was, in fact, illegal, ISP claims that 
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what the district court held was that the "sort of illegality that Black claimed was not the sort 
protected by the act." Response Br., p. 10-11 (citation omitted). This contention ignores the 
plain language of the district court's opinion: "Thus, whistleblower case law from Idaho and 
other jurisdictions shows that refusal is a protected activity only when the employee refuses to 
perform an illegal act." R., p. 000522. This holding by the Court is in direct contravention of 
this Court's holding in Van. Furthermore, it is clear from the district court's decision that this 
erroneous interpretation of the Whistleblower Act was fundamental to its decision. As such, 
Black respectfully requests that the district court's decision be reversed. 
B. The facts before the District Court and this Court present genuine issues of 
material fact to be presented to a jury. 
L. Black has demonstrated that genuine issues of material fact exist as to 
whether he had a good faith belief of a suspected violation o(law. rule or 
regulation and whether he refi1sed to adhere to a directive that he 
reasonably believed to be in violation of the law. 
ISP argues that Black has not demonstrated that the directives provided implicate 
a suspected violation of law or rule. This issue was addressed at length in Black's opening brief 
and will not be repeated in its entirety here. Opening Br., pp. 9-31. However, given ISP's 
arguments, it is worth again repeating that Black believed the directives to be in violation of 
Idaho Code§ 19-5116 and IDAPA 11.11.031. R., pp. 000233, 000409 (Russell Depa.), 103:16-
19, 000586-000587 (Black Depa.), 145:23 - 146:5, 146:7, 000610-000612, 000618-000623. 
Likewise, it is worth repeating that Black testified that his beliefs and positions were developed 
over a years of interaction with POST, POST Council, POST employees and his review of the 
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statutes and regulations. R., pp., 000310-311, ifi! 4-9, 000317, if 36, 000397-000400, 000585 
(Black Depa)., 141:21 -141:15, R., and p. 000586 (Black Depa.), 144:10-16. 
ISP argues that merely questioning and defying authority is not entitled to 
protection under the Whistleblower Act. Response Br., p. 12. Black would agree that where an 
employee questions and refuses directives without a good faith and reasonable belief that the 
directives are violations or suspected violations of law, no protection is afforded. However, 
where the communication and/or refusal are based upon interpretation of statutes, rules or 
regulations of the State, an employee is entitled to protection. Given that Black's actions were 
directly based upon his interpretation of portions of the Idaho Code as well as IDAPA 
regulations, ISP's argument fails. 
2. The entirety of Black's testimony demonstrates his belief that directives 
were illegal or, if adhered to, would have required Black to commit an 
illegal act. 
ISP writes that Black admitted that nothing he was told would have forced him to 
violate the law or do anything illegal. Response Br., pp. 10 and 12. In support of this 
contention, ISP cites to a single page in the record. Id. What ISP fails to address is Black's 
testimony that he believed the order to move Lori Guthrie "violated that ID APA rule[]" and that 
he "would be in violation of IDAPA rules and Idaho Code on all of those if I complied with 
them." R., pp. 000584-000585 (Black Depa.) at 135:21 - 136:1 and 138:5 - 8. Likewise, ISP 
fails to address Black's testimony that seven (7) different directives from Col. Russell either 
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were in violation of a rule, regulation or law or that would have put Black in violation of a rule, 
regulation or law had Black adhered to the directive. R., pp. 589 (Black Depa.) at 154:1 -157:8. 
This testimony of Black cannot be ignored at summary judgment. ISP asked the 
district court to ignore this testimony and the district court erroneously accepted this invitation 
and ignored this testimony. ISP now asks this Court to ignore testimony in the record. In 
accordance with long-established summary judgment standards, Black requests that the Court 
decline the invitation to ignore evidence and instead consider the evidence in the record in the 
light most favorable to Black and to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in his 
favor. When summary judgment standards are adhered to and all evidence is considered in the 
proper light, it is clear that Black communicated in good faith belief a suspected violation of law, 
rule or regulation. Likewise, it is clear that Black refused a directive based upon a reasonable 
belief that the directive was in violation of law. 
3. The purpose of the Whistle blower Act is served bv allowing this matter to 
proceed to trial. 
ISP asserts that Black's contention has "sweeping implications" that cannot be 
reconciled with statutes and rules related to public employment. Response Br., p. 12. This 
argument fails. Black does not contend that an employee may simply refuse a directive based 
upon a personal disagreement with a supervisor. On the contrary, Black merely contends, that 
where an employee complies with the terms of the Whistleblower Act, he or she is entitled to 
protection. This necessarily requires a finding that the refusal was made upon a reasonable belief 
of a violation of law. Likewise, where the employee communicates concern about a directive or 
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action, the communication must be made with a good faith belief that the directive or action is in 
violation of law. 
In Boelter v. City of Coon Rapids, the Court recognized that the refusal to follow 
even a lawful directive is protected provided that there exists a good faith belief in the illegality 
of the directive. 67 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (D. Minn. 1999). The plaintiff in Boelter contended that 
the City's policy regarding military leave violated both state and federal laws. Id. at 1042. 
Despite the fact that "[i]t [wa]s clear, in the Court's view, that the Military Time - Pay Request 
form does not violate" the federal or state laws cited by the plaintiff, the Court denied the City's 
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1050. The Court explained its decision: 
This conclusion does not end the inquiry of whether [plaintiff] has 
made out a claim under the whistleblower statute, contrary to 
Defendants' suggestions. The relevant question, in establishing the 
first element of a prima facie case, is whether [plaintiff] engaged in 
statutorily-protected conduct. Minn. Stat. § I81.932, subd. l(a) 
speaks to an employee who, "in good faith, reports a violation or 
suspected violation" of the law. It is irrelevant, for purposes of this 
subdivision, whether there was an actual violation of the law. The 
"only requirement" is that the report of the violation or suspected 
violation be "made in good faith." Good faith, moreover, is 
normally a question of fact for the jury. 
Id. (citations omitted). Just as in Boelter, the Whistle blower Act does not require that the 
directive be an actual violation. I.C. § 6-2104 and Van, 147 Idaho at 559, 212 P.3d 982. The 
relevant inquiry and focus is on the good faith belief of the individual making the report and/or 
refusing the directive. Allowing an employee to communicate a violation or suspected violation, 
or refuse a directive upon a reasonable belief of a violation of law, even when the conduct 
complained of ultimately is deemed to be lawful, promotes the "integrity of government" by 
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fostering an environment where employees feel free to raise their concerns. See I.C. § 6-2104. 
To hold otherwise would stifle the reporting of waste or violations of laws, rules or regulations 
except in the most extreme circumstances. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff/Appellant Jeffry J. Black respectfully 
requests that the Court reverse the District Court's decision granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and remand this matter to the District Court for further proceedings 
including but not limited to trial. 
DATED this 211d day of October, 2012. 
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC 
B~~ 
Chad M. Nicholson 
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiff 
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